feat: add private relay for end-to-end-encrypted remote access (#2087)
Adds OpenChamber Relay — an opt-in way to reach an instance from a phone, browser, or another desktop from anywhere, with no open inbound ports, no tunnel, and no shared LAN. The instance dials outbound to a relay; all app traffic (HTTP, the event stream, terminal, dictation) is multiplexed and encrypted through a single connection per client, so the relay only ever forwards opaque ciphertext. Transport - End-to-end-encrypted channel over WebCrypto (ECDH P-256 -> HKDF -> AES-256-GCM) with a capability-negotiated handshake and a small HTTP/SSE/WebSocket multiplexing protocol. A byte-compatible JS host mirror is cross-checked by tests. - Host: outbound connection manager, per-client tunnel dispatcher to the local server over loopback, reuse of the existing instance identity key, and management routes. Disabled by default; explicit opt-in. - Client: plugs into the existing runtime layer (runtime-fetch/-url/-switch/ -auth, event pipeline, terminal, dictation) so features work over the relay unchanged; direct-URL and Electron realtime-proxy paths are untouched. Pairing & UX - Relay section in Settings -> Remote Instances (live status, QR/link pairing, revocation via the existing client-token list) and the mobile connect flow. - Frame batching and idle-gated keepalive keep tunnel message volume low without affecting streaming smoothness. Security - The tunnel is transport only; the server authenticates every tunneled request exactly as for a direct remote client. fragments only. The relay stores no keys, tokens, or payloads. Operability - The endpoint can be pinned to a self-hosted rel paired clients inherit it from the offer automatically. - Relay module DOCUMENTATION.md and a relay-trans invariants that future WebSocket/streaming changes must follow. The relay transport is complete and tested; the UI for enabling and pairing is gated behind openchamber_relay_gate and stays
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@@ -264,6 +264,9 @@ function parseArgs(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
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}
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break;
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}
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case 'relay':
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options.relay = true;
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break;
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case 'qr':
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options.qr = true;
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options.explicitQr = true;
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@@ -384,6 +387,7 @@ OPTIONS:
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--hostname Alias for --host outside tunnel commands
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--lan Bind to 0.0.0.0 for LAN access
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--server <url> Public/server URL for connect-url links
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--relay connect-url: generate an end-to-end-encrypted relay pairing link
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--ui-password Protect browser UI with single password
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--api-only Start API routes only, without serving browser UI assets
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--foreground Run server in foreground (use with systemd/process managers)
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@@ -461,6 +465,10 @@ OPTIONS:
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--lan Bind to 0.0.0.0 for LAN access when starting
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--server <url> Public URL saved into the connection link
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--server-url <url> Alias for --server
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--relay Generate an end-to-end-encrypted relay pairing link
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(no server URL needed; requires the relay enabled on
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this instance). Set OPENCHAMBER_RELAY_URL to use a
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self-hosted relay.
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--name <label> Label saved with the remote client token
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--ui-password <value> Protect browser access when UI routes are enabled
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--api-only Start in headless/API-only mode when starting
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@@ -473,6 +481,7 @@ EXAMPLES:
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openchamber connect-url --port 3000 --qr
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openchamber connect-url --port 3000 --api-only --lan --server http://workstation.local:3000 --qr
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openchamber connect-url --server https://openchamber.example.com --name Workstation
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openchamber connect-url --relay --name "My laptop"
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`);
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}
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