feat: add private relay for end-to-end-encrypted remote access (#2087)
Adds OpenChamber Relay — an opt-in way to reach an instance from a phone, browser, or another desktop from anywhere, with no open inbound ports, no tunnel, and no shared LAN. The instance dials outbound to a relay; all app traffic (HTTP, the event stream, terminal, dictation) is multiplexed and encrypted through a single connection per client, so the relay only ever forwards opaque ciphertext. Transport - End-to-end-encrypted channel over WebCrypto (ECDH P-256 -> HKDF -> AES-256-GCM) with a capability-negotiated handshake and a small HTTP/SSE/WebSocket multiplexing protocol. A byte-compatible JS host mirror is cross-checked by tests. - Host: outbound connection manager, per-client tunnel dispatcher to the local server over loopback, reuse of the existing instance identity key, and management routes. Disabled by default; explicit opt-in. - Client: plugs into the existing runtime layer (runtime-fetch/-url/-switch/ -auth, event pipeline, terminal, dictation) so features work over the relay unchanged; direct-URL and Electron realtime-proxy paths are untouched. Pairing & UX - Relay section in Settings -> Remote Instances (live status, QR/link pairing, revocation via the existing client-token list) and the mobile connect flow. - Frame batching and idle-gated keepalive keep tunnel message volume low without affecting streaming smoothness. Security - The tunnel is transport only; the server authenticates every tunneled request exactly as for a direct remote client. fragments only. The relay stores no keys, tokens, or payloads. Operability - The endpoint can be pinned to a self-hosted rel paired clients inherit it from the offer automatically. - Relay module DOCUMENTATION.md and a relay-trans invariants that future WebSocket/streaming changes must follow. The relay transport is complete and tested; the UI for enabling and pairing is gated behind openchamber_relay_gate and stays
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// Host relay identity: the EXISTING ECDSA P-256 signing keypair (shared with
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// the push relay via signing-key.js — same storage, same serverId) plus a NEW
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// long-lived ECDH P-256 encryption keypair for the E2EE channel (WebCrypto
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// keys are single-purpose, so signing and encryption keys must differ).
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// The encryption keypair is persisted as `settings.relayEncryptionKey =
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// { privateJwk, publicJwk }`, mirroring the relaySigningKey precedent.
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import {
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canonicalPublicJwkString,
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deriveServerId,
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getOrCreateRelaySigningKeypair,
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signRelayMessage,
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} from './signing-key.js';
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import { exportPublicKeyJwk, generateEcdhKeyPair, importEcdhPrivateKey } from './e2ee.js';
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const isJwkPair = (value) => Boolean(value && typeof value === 'object' && value.privateJwk && value.publicJwk);
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/**
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* @param {{ crypto: typeof import('node:crypto'), readSettingsFromDiskMigrated: () => Promise<object>, writeSettingsToDisk: (settings: object) => Promise<void> }} deps
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*/
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export const createRelayIdentityRuntime = (deps) => {
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const { crypto, readSettingsFromDiskMigrated, writeSettingsToDisk } = deps;
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let cachedIdentity = null;
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const getOrCreateEncryptionKeypair = async () => {
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const settings = await readSettingsFromDiskMigrated();
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const existing = settings?.relayEncryptionKey;
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if (isJwkPair(existing)) {
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return existing;
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}
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const keyPair = await generateEcdhKeyPair();
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const privateJwk = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk', keyPair.privateKey);
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const publicJwk = await exportPublicKeyJwk(keyPair.publicKey);
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await writeSettingsToDisk({ ...settings, relayEncryptionKey: { privateJwk, publicJwk } });
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return { privateJwk, publicJwk };
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};
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/**
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* @returns {Promise<{
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* serverId: string,
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* hostEncPubJwk: JsonWebKey,
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* hostEncPrivateKey: CryptoKey,
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* signRelayAuth: (role: string, connectionId?: string | null) => { ts: number, sig: string, pk: string },
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* }>}
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*/
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const getRelayIdentity = async () => {
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if (cachedIdentity) return cachedIdentity;
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const signing = await getOrCreateRelaySigningKeypair({ crypto, readSettingsFromDiskMigrated, writeSettingsToDisk });
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const serverId = deriveServerId({ crypto }, signing.publicJwk);
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const encryption = await getOrCreateEncryptionKeypair();
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const hostEncPrivateKey = await importEcdhPrivateKey(encryption.privateJwk);
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const pk = Buffer.from(canonicalPublicJwkString(signing.publicJwk), 'utf8').toString('base64url');
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// Relay-layer auth for host-control / host-data upgrades. Signature payload
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// string is `${ts}.${serverId}.${role}.${connectionId ?? ""}` (spec Layer 1).
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const signRelayAuth = (role, connectionId) => {
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const ts = Date.now();
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const sig = signRelayMessage({ crypto }, signing.privateKey, `${ts}.${serverId}.${role}.${connectionId ?? ''}`);
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return { ts, sig, pk };
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};
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cachedIdentity = {
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serverId,
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hostEncPubJwk: encryption.publicJwk,
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hostEncPrivateKey,
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signRelayAuth,
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};
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return cachedIdentity;
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};
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return { getRelayIdentity };
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};
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