fix: authenticate terminal WebSockets synchronously on Bun

This commit is contained in:
Bohdan Triapitsyn
2026-09-03 11:49:34 +03:00
parent e885afbe89
commit dfb3c614c8
4 changed files with 57 additions and 26 deletions
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ export const createRequestSecurityRuntime = (deps) => {
return { origins, hosts };
};
const isRequestOriginAllowed = async (req) => {
const isRequestOriginAllowed = (req) => {
const originHeader = typeof req.headers.origin === 'string' ? req.headers.origin.trim() : '';
if (!originHeader) {
return false;
@@ -120,15 +120,21 @@ export const createRequestSecurityRuntime = (deps) => {
return false;
}
const candidates = await getRequestOriginCandidates(req);
if (candidates.origins.has(origin.origin)) return true;
const forwardedHostHeader = req.headers['x-forwarded-host'];
const forwardedHost = (Array.isArray(forwardedHostHeader) ? forwardedHostHeader[0] : forwardedHostHeader || '')
.split(',')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
const hostHeader = req.headers.host;
const host = forwardedHost || (Array.isArray(hostHeader) ? hostHeader[0] : hostHeader || '').trim().toLowerCase();
if (host && host === origin.host.toLowerCase()) return true;
// TLS commonly ends at a cloud edge before an HTTP hop to OpenChamber.
// In that setup the browser's Origin is https while a generic reverse
// proxy reports the upstream request as http. The external host remains
// authoritative, so compare it directly instead of requiring the proxy to
// preserve the browser-facing protocol.
return candidates.hosts.has(origin.host.toLowerCase());
return getRequestOriginCandidates(req).then((candidates) => (
candidates.origins.has(origin.origin) || candidates.hosts.has(origin.host.toLowerCase())
));
};
return {
@@ -9,55 +9,55 @@ describe('request security runtime', () => {
test('allows packaged client origins for remote client transports', async () => {
const runtime = createRuntime();
await expect(runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
expect(await runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
headers: {
origin: 'openchamber-ui://app',
host: '192.168.1.130:1202',
},
socket: {},
})).resolves.toBe(true);
})).toBe(true);
await expect(runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
expect(await runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
headers: {
origin: 'capacitor://localhost',
host: '192.168.1.130:1202',
},
socket: {},
})).resolves.toBe(true);
})).toBe(true);
// Android Capacitor WebView (androidScheme 'https') reports this origin.
await expect(runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
expect(await runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
headers: {
origin: 'https://localhost',
host: '192.168.1.130:1202',
},
socket: {},
})).resolves.toBe(true);
})).toBe(true);
});
test('rejects unknown origins', async () => {
const runtime = createRuntime();
await expect(runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
expect(await runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
headers: {
origin: 'https://evil.example.com',
host: '192.168.1.130:1202',
},
socket: {},
})).resolves.toBe(false);
})).toBe(false);
});
test('allows the external host when TLS terminates before an HTTP proxy hop', async () => {
const runtime = createRuntime();
await expect(runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
expect(await runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
headers: {
origin: 'https://devchamber.example.com',
host: 'devchamber.example.com',
'x-forwarded-proto': 'http',
},
socket: {},
})).resolves.toBe(true);
})).toBe(true);
});
test('uses the forwarded external host without trusting a different origin', async () => {
@@ -71,13 +71,13 @@ describe('request security runtime', () => {
socket: {},
};
await expect(runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
expect(await runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
...request,
headers: { ...request.headers, origin: 'https://devchamber.example.com' },
})).resolves.toBe(true);
await expect(runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
})).toBe(true);
expect(await runtime.isRequestOriginAllowed({
...request,
headers: { ...request.headers, origin: 'https://evil.example.com' },
})).resolves.toBe(false);
})).toBe(false);
});
});