Project action URLs now open in the system browser from Electron Adds a safe Electron shell bridge for external HTTP links
147 lines
5.3 KiB
JavaScript
147 lines
5.3 KiB
JavaScript
import { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } from 'electron';
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const eventListeners = new Map();
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const readArgValue = (name) => {
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const prefix = `${name}=`;
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const entry = process.argv.find((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.startsWith(prefix));
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if (!entry) {
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return '';
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}
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return entry.slice(prefix.length);
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};
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const localOrigin = readArgValue('--openchamber-local-origin');
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const homeDirectory = readArgValue('--openchamber-home');
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const macosMajorRaw = readArgValue('--openchamber-macos-major');
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const macosMajor = Number.parseInt(macosMajorRaw, 10);
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// Preload re-executes on every cross-origin navigation (we run with
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// sandbox:false, per-document). Two separate concerns to balance:
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// - __OPENCHAMBER_ELECTRON__ is a shell-identity flag (no capability).
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// Remote UIs still need it so isDesktopShell() returns true and the
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// window renders with desktop affordances (DesktopHostSwitcher,
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// title bar offsets, etc.). Expose unconditionally.
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// - __TAURI__ is the IPC channel to the main process. Remote pages must
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// not get it — otherwise any page loaded via DesktopHostSwitcher could
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// read local files, open apps, relaunch, etc. Expose only on local
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// pages (loopback / state.localOrigin / file:// for dev).
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// Everything driven by localOrigin (home dir, macOS hints) also stays
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// local-only since it leaks info about the Electron host machine.
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const currentOrigin = (() => {
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try {
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return typeof location !== 'undefined' ? location.origin : '';
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} catch {
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return '';
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}
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})();
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const isLoopbackOrigin = /^https?:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(?::\d+)?$/i.test(currentOrigin);
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const isLocalPage = currentOrigin === 'null'
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|| isLoopbackOrigin
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|| (localOrigin && currentOrigin === localOrigin);
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// Remote pages need __OPENCHAMBER_LOCAL_ORIGIN__ so the HostSwitcher knows
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// the URL of the Local entry (isDesktopLocalOriginActive() falls back to
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// window.location.origin otherwise — wrong on remote). Low risk: the value
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// is just "http://127.0.0.1:<port>" which is not exploitable without the
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// IPC channel, and CORS on the local server prevents remote-origin fetches.
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if (localOrigin) {
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contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('__OPENCHAMBER_LOCAL_ORIGIN__', localOrigin);
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}
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// Home directory leaks the OS username — keep local-only. Remote pages
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// operate on the REMOTE server's filesystem, local home is irrelevant
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// (and would be misleading if consumed as a workspace hint).
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if (isLocalPage && homeDirectory) {
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contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('__OPENCHAMBER_HOME__', homeDirectory);
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}
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// macOS major version drives window chrome offsets (traffic lights) — UI
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// presentation only, safe to expose.
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if (Number.isFinite(macosMajor) && macosMajor > 0) {
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contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('__OPENCHAMBER_MACOS_MAJOR__', macosMajor);
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}
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contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('__OPENCHAMBER_ELECTRON__', {
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runtime: 'electron',
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});
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// Note: bootOutcome must stay writable from the main world's initScript so
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// re-navigations (host switch via deep link) can refresh it. contextBridge-
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// exposed globals are read-only, which blocks that update — rely solely on
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// the main-process initScript injection (dispatched on did-finish-load).
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const addListener = (event, handler) => {
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const listeners = eventListeners.get(event) || new Set();
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listeners.add(handler);
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eventListeners.set(event, listeners);
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return () => {
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const current = eventListeners.get(event);
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if (!current) {
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return;
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}
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current.delete(handler);
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if (current.size === 0) {
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eventListeners.delete(event);
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}
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};
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};
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const dispatchNativeEvent = (event, detail) => {
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const listeners = eventListeners.get(event);
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if (listeners) {
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for (const listener of listeners) {
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try {
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listener({ payload: detail });
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} catch (error) {
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console.error(`[electron:preload] listener failed for ${event}:`, error);
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}
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}
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}
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try {
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const domEvent = detail === undefined
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? new Event(event)
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: new CustomEvent(event, { detail });
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window.dispatchEvent(domEvent);
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} catch (error) {
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console.error(`[electron:preload] failed to dispatch DOM event ${event}:`, error);
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}
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};
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// Main-process events are read-only notifications (update progress,
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// window focus, etc.) — safe to deliver to any page rendered in this
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// webContents. The events themselves don't grant capability.
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ipcRenderer.on('openchamber:emit', (_evt, payload) => {
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if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object') {
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return;
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}
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const event = typeof payload.event === 'string' ? payload.event : '';
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if (!event) {
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return;
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}
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dispatchNativeEvent(event, payload.detail);
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});
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// __TAURI__ is exposed on all pages; the main-process gate in
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// ipcMain.handle('openchamber:invoke') decides per-command what is safe
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// for non-local callers (window/host-switcher ops yes, file/shell ops
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// no). See COMMANDS_SAFE_FOR_REMOTE in main.mjs.
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contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('__TAURI__', {
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core: {
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invoke: (cmd, args) => ipcRenderer.invoke('openchamber:invoke', cmd, args || {}),
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},
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dialog: {
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open: (options) => ipcRenderer.invoke('openchamber:dialog:open', options || {}),
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},
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shell: {
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open: (url) => ipcRenderer.invoke('openchamber:invoke', 'desktop_open_external_url', { url }),
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},
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event: {
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listen: async (event, handler) => addListener(event, handler),
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},
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});
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